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Abstract: 
This paper outlines a new method for using qualitative information to analyze the monetary 
policy strategy of central banks. Quantitative assessment indicators that are extracted from a 
central bank's public statements via the balance statistic approach are employed to estimate a 
Taylor-type rule. This procedure allows to directly capture a policymaker's assessments of 
macroeconomic variables that are relevant for its decision making process. As an application 
of the proposed method the monetary policy of the Bundesbank is re-investigated with a new 
dataset. One distinctive feature of the Bundesbank's strategy consisted of targeting growth in 
monetary aggregates. The analysis using the proposed method provides evidence that the 
Bundesbank indeed took into consideration monetary aggregates but also real economic 
activity and inflation developments in its monetary policy strategy since 1975. 
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Empirical analyses of monetary policy are usually characterized by estimating
interest rate rules which express the central bank’s policy rate as a function of
data on macroeconomic variables. One strand of literature in this ￿eld uses
qualitative information to capture a policymaker’s assessments of macroe-
conomic variables that are important for its decision making process. 1 The
analysis in this chapter extends that literature and outlines how quantitative
assessment indicators that are generated from a central bank’s statements
about economic and monetary developments can be used to estimate a mon-
etary policy rule.
The information contained in a policymaker’s assessment of macroeco-
nomic variables is not available when estimating monetary policy rules only
as a function of these variables, the policymaker’s assessment of a variable
di￿ers from the numerical value of that variable. For example, a policymaker
might think that a shock to variables that play an important role for its mon-
etary policy, such as the in￿ation rate, is of temporary nature only. In this
case the shock will not be attributed much weight in the central bank’s mon-
etary policy decisions. In contrast, if a policymaker judges the shock to be of
permanent nature its actions are likely to be shaped (partly) in response to
the shock. The central bank will take decisions depending on its assessment
of the shock and communicate both, decision and its underlying motivation,
to the public.
Through transparency and communication central banks achieve an un-
derstanding of their monetary policy decisions in the public which not at
least improves the e￿ciency of their monetary policy. Since for this reason
most central banks regularly explain and communicate their monetary pol-
icy decisions it o￿ers the possibility to use this information for an analysis
of their monetary policy. To capture this information about variables that
are important for its decision making process, such as, for example, real eco-
nomic activity, a central bank’s public statements obtained from its regular
economic statistical bulletin can be collected and used. The approach pro-
posed in this chapter consists, in a ￿rst step, of assigning these statements
ordinal index marks which depend on whether the statement is indicative of
an (i) upward, (ii) downward or (iii) no deviation of the variables of inter-
est from trend. In a second step these ordinally indexed statements are then
transformed with the balance statistic approach into quantitative assessment
indicators, which can be used for statistical analysis.
As an application of the proposed method a new dataset that allows to
1For a general review of Taylor-type rules see Orphanides (1998).
1re-examine the monetary policy strategy of the Bundesbank is set up. The
Bundesbank’s monetary policy continues to be considered as a benchmark for
many central banks in light of the Bundesbank’s success in maintaining price
stability. One distinctive feature of its strategy was the targeting of growth in
monetary aggregates. However, this notion has been challenged by Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (1998) as well as Bernanke and Mihov (1997) who ￿nd
monetary aggregates to be statistically insigni￿cant when estimating Taylor-
type rules for the Bundesbank. Using the assessment indicators approach for
analyzing the monetary policy of the Bundesbank provides evidence that the
Bundesbank indeed took into consideration monetary aggregates but also real
economic activity and in￿ation developments in its monetary policy strategy
since 1975.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews
the existing literature. Section 3 describes the construction of assessment
indicators and Section 4 provides an analysis of the Bundesbank’s monetary
policy using the proposed method. Section 5 concludes.
2 Review of Previous Literature
The usefulness of qualitative information to investigate a central bank’s mon-
etary policy has been presented in numerous analyses. In a related arti-
cle Gerlach (2007) constructs quantitative indicators of the ECB Governing
Council’s assessments of economic conditions to analyze its interest rate de-
cisions and ￿nds that the ECB did not react to temporary in￿ation shocks
but to economic activity because it in￿uences the outlook for in￿ation. Fur-
thermore, the Eidgen￿ssische Technische Hochschule Z￿rich (2007) sets up
an indicator that captures the ECB president’s statements concerning risks
to price stability. The statements are translated into an index that contains
information about the future path of monetary policy of the ECB. Using that
index, Lamla and Rupprecht (2006) ￿nd that the ECB communication a￿ects
the term structure in the medium term and provide evidence that the ECB’s
forecasts of price developments and interpretations are important news for
the markets. Sturm and de Haan (2009), also using the index and four ad-
ditional qualitative information indicators 2 analyse whether communication
by the ECB o￿ers additional information as compared to the information
content in standard Taylor rules. They provide evidence that the indica-
tors indeed contain additional information that helps predict future policy
2The four additional communication indicators are (i) an updated version of the Rosa
and Verga (2007) index, (ii) the index of Heinemann and Ullrich (2007), (iii) the aggregate
index of Berger, de Haan, and Sturm (2006), and (iv) the indicator of Ullrich (2008).
2decisions from the ECB.
Heinemann and Ullrich (2007) analyse the information content of ECB
statements during monthly press conferences and show that including an
indicator for signal words can improve a model’s ￿t when added to standard
explanatory variables in a Taylor rule. Berger, de Haan, and Sturm (2006)
analyse the role of money in the ECB monetary policy using qualitative
information from the introductory statements of the ECB monthly press
conferences. The authors ￿nd that the indicator of the monetary policy only
plays a minor role in the ECB’s interest rate decision. Rosa and Verga (2005)
analyze to what extent markets react to the information of the ECB released
during its press conferences. Translating the qualitative information of the
press conferences into an ordinal scale they ￿nd that the public understands
and believes in the signals sent by the ECB.
Hansen and De Haan (2010) examine whether ECB statements on the
main re￿nancing rate and future in￿ation are signi￿cantly related to interest
rate decisions. In an out-of-sample evaluation they show that communication
based models do not outperform models based on macroeconomic data in
predicting policy rate decisions. Hayo, Kutan, and Neuenkirch (2008) study
the e￿ect of Federal Open Market Commitee (FOMC) communication on
U.S. ￿nancial markets. The authors ￿nd that more formal communication
channels such as monetary policy reports have a higher impact on ￿nancial
markets’ return and volatility.
Hayo and Neuenkirch (2009) use a Taylor rule augmented with Federal
reserve communication indicators and ￿nd that including the communication
indicators signi￿cantly improves explanatory power for interest rate decisions
in and out of sample. Pakko (2005) analyses the predictive content of U.S.
FOMC statements containing information about a subsequent tightening or
easing of monetary policy. Using a Taylor rule framework he provides evi-
dence that these statements are usefull for forecasting changes in the federal
funds target.
In a broader sense this paper is also related to the so-called ‘narrative
approach’ - the identi￿cation of monetary shocks through non-statistical pro-
cedures. This literature involves historical records that contain information
about the motives that led to decisions by monetary authorities. For exam-
ple, Romer and Romer (2004) use quantitative and narrative records to infer
the Federal Reserve’s intention for its target rate and ￿nd that monetary
policy decisions by the Federal Reserve had large and rapid e￿ects on output
and in￿ation.
In the next section the method of constructing assessment indicators to
capture qualitative information from a central bank’s statements proposed
in this paper is outlined.
33 Construction of Assessment Indicators
Transparency and accountability have become central elements in the statute
of most central banks.3 Not at least to counterbalance the assigned indepen-
dence, they have to justify their policy decisions vis-￿-vis the public and out-
line to which extent they achieve the assigned policy objective. Central banks
communicate this information, for example, via giving press conferences, or-
ganizing research conferences, publicizing minutes of internal meetings, and
issuing economic statistical bulletins. At the same time these communica-
tion channels o￿er central banks the opportunity to in￿uence expectations
and thereby the opportunity of more e￿ciently implementing their monetary
policy.4 The information captured in a central bank’s communication hence
o￿ers an important point of departure for analyzing their monetary policy.
Among the outlined communication channels, economic statistical bul-
letins have an outstanding position. For example, the ECB’s monthly bulletin
is described to be its ￿communication ￿agship￿. 5 To enhance the public un-
derstanding of monetary policy, economic statistical bulletins contain ￿some
descriptive commentary and analysis that go beyond data dissemination￿. 6
Most central bank’s bulletins consist of a statistical section with economic
key ￿gures and a section in which these key ￿gures are interpreted with re-
spect to the overall economic situation, and in light of the monetary policy
decisions taken by the central bank. In addition they contain articles cover-
ing a broad range of topics related to economic questions that help foster a
deeper understanding of the economy and contribute to the academic debate.
The proposed method in this paper uses the information conveyed by a cen-
tral bank’s assessment of macroeconomic variables based on the statements
given in its periodic economic statistical bulletins. 7
3For an overview on the importance of transparency and accountability for central
banks see, for example, Eij￿nger and Hoeberichts (2002) or Hahn (2002). For a theoret-
ical and empirical analysis on transparency see, for example, Faust and Svensson (2001)
and Eij￿nger and Geraats (2006), respectively. Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, de Haan,
and Jansen (2008) give a survey on the communication channel and show that it has be-
come increasingly important for the conduct of monetary policy. In particular they ￿nd
that central bank communication can move ￿nancial markets and makes monetary policy
decisions more predictable. Amato, Morris, and Shin (2002) explore the economic e￿ects
of public information in monetary policy and ￿nd that it is very e￿ective in in￿uencing
agents, however, that there is also a danger if agents only rely on that channel to coordinate
actions away from fundamentals.
4On the importance of expectation formation for the conduct of monetary policy, see,
for example, Demertzis (2006).
5Issing (2008), p. 74.
6Dyiobek and Jin (2002), p. 2.
7It is straightforward to extend the coverage of assessment indicators outlined in this
4The following subsection outlines how statements are selected from eco-
nomic statistical bulletins and assigned to prespeci￿ed categories that are
relevant for a central bank’s monetary policy decisions.
3.1 The Statement Data Set
Prior to capturing information from statements, di￿erent categories that will
serve to group the statements have to be speci￿ed. One possibility to deter-
mine potential categories for grouping the statements is to use the structure
of the analyzed economic statistical bulletin. The structure of analysis in a
central bank’s monthly bulletin gives an important indication as to which
areas are important for its monetary policy decisions. For example, the ECB
structures its analyses in the monthly bulletins into the categories ‘the ex-
ternal environment of the euro area’, ‘monetary and ￿nancial developments’,
‘prices and costs’, ‘output demand and the labour market’, and ‘exchange
rate and balance of payments developments’. The Bundesbank subdivided
its analyses into ‘monetary developments’, ‘securities markets’, ‘public ￿-
nances’, ‘economic situation’ and ‘balance of payments’. The Swiss National
Bank structures its analyses in the quarterly monetary policy reports into the
categories ‘developments in the global economy’, ‘developments in the Swiss
economy’, ‘monetary developments’, and ‘SNB in￿ation forecast’. Another
possibility to determine potential categories is to refer to standard variables
used in the estimation of monetary policy rules such as ‘real activity’ to group
statements that allow inference about the output gap, and ’price activity’ to
get an indication about the deviation of in￿ation from target.
After having identi￿ed the categories used in the analysis of the central
bank’s monetary policy, the next step consists of identifying and collecting
statements in which the central bank assesses (part of) these categories.
Statements in economic statistical bulletins very often do not touch directly
upon a speci￿ed category but instead assess key-variables from the de￿ned
category. For example, a category ‘real activity’ could be assessed, inter alia,
with variables like ‘investment’, ‘industrial production’, and ‘employment’.
Each statement about a key-variable gives a hint as to how the central bank
assesses (part of) the information that is available about the state in the
according category at the time the assessment is given.
Assessments might refer to variables’ past developments or their expected
developments in the future. Central banks often refer to past values of vari-
ables because the numbers provided by the statistical o￿ces are mainly avail-
paper beyond capturing information from economic statistical bulletins only, for example,
via using statements given during press conferences, interviews etc.
5able with a certain time lag. However, all variables evaluated in a de￿ned
category re￿ect the motives for the central bank’s monetary policy decisions
at the time the assessment is given, that is, i t and will thus be used in the
following to set up the assessment indicators for each category in t.
At this stage of analysis one has available for each point in time, that
is for each issue of the economic statistical bulletin of the analyzed central
bank, numerous statements for each category.
The next subsection outlines how an ordinal index mark can be assigned
to each of the collected statements.
3.2 The Index
To reduce arbitrariness in the evaluation of statements the procedure outlined
in the following only uses three option ordinal index numbers and con￿nes
evidence containing information about changes in the monetary policy stance
to the occurrence of key-words. When assigning ordinal index numbers to
the collected statements it is important (i) to determine whether a state-
ment’s subject variable is out-of-trend (deviates from its normally expected
value), and if so (ii) whether the variable has positive or negative in￿uence
on the category (is positively or negatively correlated with the category) it
is assigned to. The following paragraph outlines when a variable should be
judged out-of-trend and how its in￿uence on the according category can be
determined.
Statements using key-words that put emphasis on the central bank’s as-
sessment of the variable under consideration, for example, ‘high’, ‘weak’,
‘markedly’, ‘extraordinarily’, or alike, indicate that the variable under con-
sideration is out-of-trend. To ￿nd out whether a variable is positively or
negatively correlated with the according category one needs to determine
under which circumstances the category deviates ￿ positively or negatively ￿
from trend. For example, it is sensible to de￿ne the category ‘real activity’
to positively (negatively) deviate from trend if economic activity is higher
(lower) than normally expected by the policymaker. The in￿uence of a vari-
able on the according category depends on whether the variable’s deviation
from trend in￿uences the category it is assigned to into the same direction
(positive in￿uence) or into the opposite direction (negative in￿uence). For
example, the variable ‘unemployment rate’ has negative in￿uence on the cat-
egory ‘real activity’ if the category is de￿ned as suggested above. Higher
than normal unemployment indicates that the economy underperforms. In
contrast, the in￿uence of the variable ‘industrial production’ on the category
‘real activity’ is then positive because high industrial production indicates
that the real economy is used to capacity. Having outlined the relation be-
6tween variables and their according category the scheme depicted on Figure
1 shows, how each statement is assigned an ordinal index mark.
First of all, one infers following the approach described in the previous
paragraph whether a statement suggests that its subject variable is out-
of-trend. If a statement is not judged to be out-of-trend it is assigned a
‘0’ in the according category [case A]. If the statement suggests that the
variable deviates from its normal state one has to ￿gure out the variable’s
in￿uence on the according category. The statement is assigned a ‘ 1’ (‘ 1’)
[case E(D)] if the variable positively deviates from its normal state and has
positive (negative) in￿uence on the category. The statement is assigned a
‘ 1’ (‘1’) [case C(B)] if the variable negatively deviates from its normal state
and its in￿uence on the according category is positive (negative). In the
following the evaluations ‘1’ and ‘ 1’ are denominated out-of-trend marks
and the categorized and evaluated set of statements will be referred to as
ordinal index data. At this stage of setting up the assessment indicators,
each category of the ordinal index data contains for each point in time many
index numbers, taking on the values ‘-1’, ‘0’, or ‘1’.
Figure 1: Assignement of Index Marks
The next subsection describes the method that is used to transform the
7ordinal index data into quantitative assessment indicators.
83.3 Transformation of the Index Into Assessment Indi-
cators
The ordinal index data have arranged the central bank’s assessments of un-
observable indicators like ‘real activity’ in an accessible way. In the follow-
ing, each individual index number is treated analogeously to a response of
the central bank under consideration to a question about its assessment of
the state in the according category. This approach o￿ers the possibility to
transform the ordinal index data into quantitative assessment indicators with
techniques known from public survey analyses.
Surveys are an important source to measure expectations ￿ or, as in the
case of this analysis, assessments ￿ directly and o￿er up-to-date information
about the state of the economy. They can be broadly divided into two classes,
namely quantitative and qualitative surveys. 8 Quantitative surveys require
precise quantitative answers. An example is the ECB’s Quarterly Survey of
Professional Forecasters which, inter alia, asks the participants for point es-
timates of Euro Area in￿ation expectations. 9 In contrast, qualitative surveys
do not directly ask the respondents for a precise ￿gure concerning the vari-
able under consideration. Instead respondents are asked to give a qualitative
indication. The latter is widely used in surveys because responses to qualita-
tive questions are more reliable than more precise questions, there is believed
to be some sort of trade-o￿ between the loss of information consequent on
qualitative questions and the cost in terms of response rate and therefore
possible bias from asking more precise questions. 10
A special form of qualitative survey is the business tendency survey which
asks respondents about recent developments and the current situation of their
business as well as about their plans and expectations for the near future.
One example for this kind of survey is the Industrial Con￿dence Indicator
published by the European Commission.11 For example, repondents are asked
whether they consider their current stock of ￿nished products to be ‘too large
(above normal)’, ‘adequate (normal)’, or ‘too small (below normal)’. Another
question asks respondents whether they expect their production to ‘increase’,
‘remain unchanged’, or ‘decrease’ over the next 3 months. The ordinal index
data described in the previous subsection are set up in the spirit of such
a tendency survey as they also consist of three-option replies. The ordinal
8Pesaran (1987)
9Garcia (2003)
10Pesaran and Weale (2005)
11An overview on the methodology of the Con￿dence Indicators used by the European
Commission is given in European Commission, DG for Economic and Financial A￿airs
(2007).
9index numbers assigned can be based on statements related to levels as well
as to changes of relevant variables.
There exist mainly three approaches to convert qualitative survey data
into quantitative data: The balance statistic approach, the regression ap-
proach and the Carlson-Parkin method. 12 While the latter two are rather
complex and based on distributional assumptions, the balance statistic ap-
proach is not outperformed as there is a very high correlation between all
three approaches when three-option replies are used. 13 The European Com-
mission, for example, makes use of the balance statistic to set up the Indus-
trial Con￿dence Indicator. The balance statistic is also the method of choice
used in this paper to transform the ordinal index data into time series of
quantitative assessment indicators. It is calculated as follows:
bsjt = ujt   djt (1)
where
 bsjt denotes the balance statistic in category j at time t,
 ujt denotes the proportion of statements that indicate a positive devi-
ation from trend in category j at time t, and
 djt denotes the proportion of statements that indicate a negative devi-
ation from trend in category j at time t.
Applying Equation 1 to the ordinal index data one obtains a quantitative
assessment indicator restricted to the interval (-1,1) for each de￿ned category
at a point in time. If no statements are available in a category it is assumed
that the assessment indicator is in line with trend, that is, the assessment
indicator is assigned a value of ‘0’.
Note that the assessment indicators contain information about the cen-
tral bank’s assessment of past and currently available data as well as on its
expectations about data in the future. The indicators obtained from this
information set hence contain real time information available to the cen-
tral bank at the time the assessment was given and are thus not subject to
the informational problems outlined in Orphanides (2001). The information
content in the assessment indicators is limited, not at least because the in-
dicators are based on three-option replies and are restricted to the interval
(-1,1). However, the more statements available for a category at a point in
12An overview about these transformation methods can be found in Pesaran and Weale
(2005).
13OECD (2003)
10time, the preciser will be the balance statistic. For example, if for a cate-
gory at a point in time there is only one statement, the assessment indicator
can take on three values, -1, 0, and 1. If instead there are two statements,
the assessment indicator can additionally take on the values -0.5 and 0.5,
etc.14 E￿ectively, the informaton content in the assessment indicators gets
less coarse if the number of statements in a category at a point in time
increases. However, no matter how many discrete values the assessment in-
dicators can take on, in tendency, they reveal the central bank’s assessment
of categories underlying its monetary policy decisions. 15
Figure 2 gives an overview of the method outlined throughout this paper.
Monthly bulletin at time t
#
Statements containing assessments of category j at time t
#
Ordinal Index for assessments of category j at time t
#
Transformation method
#
Quantitative assessment indicator of category j at time t
Where t covers the time dimension, and j denotes di￿erent speci￿ed categories.
Figure 2: Method to Generate Assessment Indicators
In the next section the monetary policy of the Bundesbank will be ana-
lyzed with the proposed method.
4 Analysis of the Bundesbank’s Monetary Pol-
icy Using Assessment Indicators
The Bundesbank’s monetary policy continues to be considered as a bench-
mark for many central banks in light of the Bundesbank’s success in main-
14Hence the analysis of Gerlach (2007) with ordinal index values that can take on 5
distinct values can be seen as an example for the case where one collects exactly two
statements for each category in each monthly bulletin analyzed.
15It is possible that the number of variables evaluated in a de￿ned category varies
between di￿erent issues of economic statistical bulletins if the central bank does not always
receive data in time or if variables are only analysed from a certain point in time onward.
For example, when growth in money funds became very large in the 1990s, the Bundesbank
created a new monetary aggregate for analysis, ‘M3 extended’, that contained these funds.
11taining price stability. One distinctive feature of its monetary policy was
the strategy of monetary targeting which the Bundesbank o￿cially followed
since 1975. Whether monetary aggregates indeed played a role in the mon-
etary policy strategy of the Bundesbank is subject to an ongoing debate.
Analyses show mixed evidence. While Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) ￿nd
that monetary aggregates did not play a signi￿cant role for the Bundesbank’s
monetary policy from 1979 to 1993, Gerberding, Worms, and Seitz (2004)
￿nd that the Bundesbank indeed took its monetary targets seriously from
1979 to 1998 and Clausen and Meier (2005) ￿nd that monetary aggregates
played a small but signi￿cant role for the Bundesbank’s interest rate decisions
between 1973 and 1998.
As an application of the method proposed in this paper the monetary
policy strategy of the Bundesbank is re-examined using a new data set. The
dataset consists of statements the Bundesbank gave in its monthly bulletins
and is utilized to construct assessment indicators that capture the Bundes-
bank’s assessment of monetary and real economic developments following the
approach outlined in the previous section. These assessment indicators are
then used to estimate a monetary policy rule.
This analysis might also be relevant for the debate about the two pillar
strategy of the ECB. The ECB was established much in the spirit of the
Bundesbank, also as regards the monetary policy strategy. Prior to the
￿nancial crisis that began in 2007 it has been subject to particular criticism
for using monetary indicators in its second pillar to assess the trends in
medium- to long-term in￿ation. If the Bundesbank actually was a monetary
targeter its eminent track record concerning price stability might suggests
that incorporating monetary aggregates in a central bank’s policy strategy
cannot be labelled as improper right away.
The following subsection outlines the monetary policy strategy of the
Bundesbank.
4.1 The Bundesbank’s Monetary Policy
The Bundesbank Act from 1957 mandated the Bundesbank to ‘safeguard the
currency’ which ultimately was interpreted as maintaining price stability. 16
To achieve this goal, since 1975 the Bundesbank’s policy consisted of pre-
announcing annual targets for growth in broad money. From 1975 to 1987
the target was de￿ned as the central bank monetary stock, that is, currency
in circulation and required reserves, and from 1988 to 1998 the Bundesbank
16On several occasions the Bundesbank stated that price stability is its statutory ￿nal
goal, for example, in Bundesbank (1995).
12targeted the monetary aggregate M3. To cross-check and verify the informa-
tion content provided by the money stock, the Bundesbank always included
other monetary and real indicators in its monetary policy analyses. The
monetary targeting strategy was implemented via controlling the quantity
of money indirectly by in￿uencing the day-to-day money market rate in the
interbank market through rediscount and lombard policies, minimum reserve
policy, and open market operations. 17
The Bundesbank determined the money growth target for the following
year via adding growth of potential output, the ‘unavoidable’ in￿ation over
the medium term, and the trend rate of change in the velocity of money. The
reasoning behind this approach was that if the money stock could be kept on
this target path, the monetary conditions should be met for corresponding
real growth to be compatible with monetary stability. 18 Although the Bun-
desbank announced the growth target on a yearly basis it frequently stressed
the medium-term nature of the approach ￿ the Bundesbank did not apply its
monetary policy mechanically but accepted short-run deviations from target
growth if neccessary. With a few technical modi￿cations this approach has
been followed since the start of this policy in 1975 although the Bundesbank
regarded monetary targeting as an experiment in the ￿rst few years. 19
Despite the fact that the Bundesbank attained only 13 of 24 money stock
targets, it impressively achieved its ultimate goal of safeguarding price stabil-
ity with an annual in￿ation rate of 3% on average between 1975 and 1998. 20
The following subsection outlines how the assessment indicators for the
Bundesbankare are set up.
4.2 Assessment Indicators for the Bundesbank
As outlined in Section 1.3, policy relevant statements can be extracted from
the analyzed central bank’s economic statistical bulletin. The monthly bul-
letin was the Bundesbank’s main instrument of communication with the pub-
lic. Prior to the emergence of European Monetary Union (EMU) the monthly
bulletins of the Bundesbank had an outstanding position in Germany in the
￿eld of regular economic publications. Since 1970 the Bundesbank regularly
incorporated economic reports in its monthly bulletins. Every quarter, two
monthly bulletins contained abridged economic reports and one monthly bul-
17Bundesbank (1995)
18Issing (1997)
19Schmid (1999)
20Own calculation: Mean year-on-year percentage change of the consumer price index;
from 1975 to 1991 only for West Germany, from 1992 to 1998 for re-united Germany.
13letin gave a detailed report on the economic situation in Germany. 21 These
parts of the monthly bulletin touched upon the di￿erent ￿elds the Bundes-
bank judged to be of importance for its monetary policy. They were orga-
nized into subsections analyzing ‘monetary development’, ‘public ￿nances’,
‘economic situation’, ‘balance of payments’, and ‘stock and bond markets’.
All monthly bulletins contained a statistical appendix with economic key
data, and infrequently essays on economic questions of interest.
To construct the assessment indicators for the Bundebank, only the a-
bridged reports and the editorials of the economic outlook in the monthly
bulletins are taken into account because in these parts the Bundesbank ex-
plained its policy decisions in the context of its analyses of economic and
monetary aspects in a condensed form. As the structure of the monthly
bulletins had undergone only minor changes since January 1970 this date is
chosen as the starting point of the sample analysed. The endpoint of the
sample is December 1998 because it marks the last month of an independent
monetary policy of the Bundesbank.
All statements from the abridged reports and the editorials of the monthly
bulletins from 1970 to 1998 that assess one or several of the categories, ‘mon-
etary activity’, ‘real activity’, ‘￿scal activity’, ‘foreign trade activity’, and
‘price activity’ have been collected. 22 Table 1 summarises the in￿uence of
the variables appearing most frequently in statements of the Bundesbank.
The average number of assessed statements per month amounts to 8.63 for
the category ‘monetary activity’, 8.68 for the category ‘real activity’, 5.89
for the category ‘￿scal activity’, 4.49 for the category ‘foreign trade activity’,
and 2.41 for the category ‘price activity’.
Several examples for the evaluation of statements are given in Appendix
A at the end of this paper.
Following the proposed method outlined in the previous section, assess-
ment indicators for the ￿ve de￿ned categories are set up. As a showcase
Figure 3 displays the assessment indicator for monetary activity, its mean
value and the number of statements in each month. The time series shows
little persistence and the number of statements assessed re￿ects that the ed-
itorials and short reports of the monthly bulletins became more extensive
over the years. While the analysed parts covered only three to ￿ve pages in
a bulletin in the 1970s, the amount of pages to be analysed at the end of the
1990s increased up to seven pages. This development took place gradually in
the course of time. As previously outlined, this makes the assessment indica-
21The Bundesbank issued economic reports prior to 1970 but not on a regular monthly
basis: within a year there were several issues of monthly bulletins containing only economic
key-data.
22In the following these ￿ve ￿elds will be referred to as categories.
14Category Variables Posi-
tively Correlated
With the category
Variables Nega-
tively Correlated
With the category
Monetary activity Monetary expansion Long-term deposits
Monetary in￿ows from
abroad
Monetary out￿ows to
abroad
Volume of money in cir-
culation
Monetary aggregates
Credits
Real activity Industrial production Unemployment
Investments
Business cycle
Labour market
Economic activity
Volume of orders
Domestic orders
Fiscal activity Public debt Inland tax revenues
Public spending / in-
vestment
Public borrowing
Public de￿cit
Foreign trade activity Orders from abroad Inland orders for
abroad
Exports Imports
Active trade balance Passive trade balance
Sales abroad
Price activity Producer prices
Year-on-year percent-
age change of the
CPI
Import prices
Table 1: Variables and Their Relation to the Assessed Category
tors’ information content less coarse for later issues of the monthly bulletins
and provides a more di￿erenciated picture of the Bundesbank’s assessment
about the economy. According ￿gures for the assessment indicators of the
other categories can be found in Appendix B at the end of this paper.
15Theoretically, deviations from trend captured by the assessment indica-
tors should be zero on average. However, the mean values of all assessment
indicators are positive, ranging from 0.06 (foreign trade activity indicator)
to 0.17 (monetary activity indicator). This might re￿ect higher vigilance
of the Bundesbank towards upward risks to price stability as compared to
downward risks if the Bundesbank did not assess upward or downward devia-
tions from trend symmetrically. In other words, the Bundesbank might have
perceived an upward deviation from trend in a category as sizeable because
this puts upward pressure on prices while the Bundesbank might not have
perceived a downward deviation of similar magnitude as sizeable if it was not
as sensible as regards downward risks to price stability.
Figure 3: Assessment Indicator for Monetary Activity
Except for the real activity indicator and the ￿scal activity indicator the
assessment indicators are not correlated with each other. This gives evidence
that the indicators capture distinct sets of information. The correlation co-
e￿cient between the real activity indicator and the ￿scal activity indicator
amounts to -0.30 which might be due to countercyclical policies of German
governments. It is very likely that in addition to the normal stabilizers, de￿cit
spending strategies were implemented when the economy was in a recession.
In the following subsection a monetary policy rule based on the outlined
assessment indicators is estimated for the Bundesbank.
164.3 A Monetary Policy Rule for the Bundesbank
Investigating the properties of monetary policy rules, Levin, Wieland, and
Williams (1998) show that ￿rst di￿erence rules perform reasonably well in
comparison to several alternatives and are robust to model uncertainty. In
their analysis they employ the ￿rst di￿erenced U.S. federal funds rate as de-
pendent variable and a measure for the deviation of in￿ation from target and
the output gap as independent variables. Other authors also use ￿rst di￿er-
ence rules to investigate the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve System
of the U.S. or the ECB. For example, Judd and Rudebusch (1998) estimate
a policy rule for the Fed with the U.S. federal funds rate in ￿rst di￿erences
as dependent variable and measures for the output gap and deviation of
in￿ation from target as independent variables. Gerlach (2007) estimates a
policy rule for the ECB using ￿rst di￿erences of the repo rate as dependent
variable, and di￿erent measures capturing real economic activity, in￿ation,
money growth, and the exchange rate as independent variables.
To investigate the monetary policy of the Bundesbank, a Taylor-type
rule will be estimated that explains the ￿rst di￿erenced German day-to-
day money market rate23 with all generated assessment indicators following
Equation (2).
it = c+1moneyt+2realt+3fiscalt+4tradet+5pricet+t (2)
where ‘i’ are the ￿rst di￿erences of the German day-to-day money market
rate (monthly averages), ‘c’ is a constant, ‘money’ denotes the deviation of
monetary activity from trend and is captured by the assessment indicator
for monetary activity, ‘real’ denotes the deviation of real activity from trend
and is captured by the assessment indicator for real economic activity, ‘￿scal’
denotes the deviation of ￿scal activity from trend and is captured by the
assessment indicator for ￿scal activity, ‘trade’ denotes the deviation of foreign
trade activity from trend and is captured by the assessment indicator for
foreign trade activity, ‘price’ denotes the deviation of price activity from
trend and is captured by the assessment indicator for price activity, and ‘ ’
is an error term. To avoid a spurious regression it is important to determine
the order of integration of the time series under consideration. All time series
used are stationary at a 5% signi￿cance level when applying the Dickey-Fuller
23Clarida and Gertler (1996) use a vector autoregressive analysis to identify the German
day-to-day money market rate as the relevant policy instrument of the Bundesbank as well
as measures for in￿ation and output gaps as explanatory variables. Similarly, Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (1998) employ the German day-to-day money market rate as dependent
variable in an estimation of a monetary policy rule for the Bundesbank, with inter alia
measures for the output gap and deviation of in￿ation from target as explanatory variables.
17test.24
Intuitively one would expect the coe￿cients of the explanatory variables
in equation (2) to be positive since high values of the assessment indicators
are indicative of upward risks to price stability.
The time span covered in the ￿rst analysis, January 1970 to 1998, might
contain structural breaks, for example, the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods
system in March 1973, the beginning of the monetary targeting strategy
of the Bundesbank in January 1975, and German re-uni￿cation in October
1990. Bai and Perron (1998) propose a procedure that allows to estimate the
number and the position of breakpoints and tests linear models with multiple
structural changes for a given data set. In the following this method will be
applied to the estimation of monetary policy rules for the Bundesbank to
detect potential breakpoints in the sample. An outline of the procedure can
be found in Appendix C at the end of this paper.
The procedure selects March 1975 as the only breakpoint. 25 Table 2 dis-
plays the estimation results for the two samples ranging from January 1970 to
March 1975, and April 1975 to December 1998. Regarding the ￿rst sample,
only the indicator for real activity is signi￿cant. 26 Given its coe￿cient, the
target rate’s ￿rst di￿erence rose by 2.84 percentage points if, ceteris paribus,
all variables from the category real activity were assessed to be above trend
(that is, the according indicator has a value of 1). The relatively high coe￿-
cient estimates are likely due to the volatility of the dependent variable during
the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system. Figure 4 displays the day-to-
day money market rate for the period of analysis. Several large changes took
place only during and shortly after the period of Bretton-Woods.
Regarding the second sample, all assessment indicators except those for
foreign trade activity and ￿scal activity are signi￿cant and have the expected
sign. If all assessments in one of the categories, monetary activity, real
activity, or price activity, ceteris paribus, were assessed to be above trend,
the day-to-day money market rate rose by 0.16, 0.22, or 0.19 percentage
24Note that the results as regards signi￿cance and breakpoint tests in the following
also hold qualitatively when estimating the Taylor-type rules not as a ￿rst-di￿erence rule
but with the level of the day-to-day money market rate as dependent variable and as
explanatory variables the lagged dependent variable as well as the assessment indicators.
However, since the dependent variable features high persistence at a monthly frequency,
it follows a unit root process.
25As a robustness check here and in the following the procedure has been implemented
with several values of the parameter that determines the minimal length of a sub-sample.
For reasonable values of this parameter the selected breakpoint is always March 1975 in
the ￿rst analysis.
26Signi￿cance is indicated by an absolute t-value of 1.96 or larger. All t-statistics are
computed with robust standard errors.
18points, respectively.
Sample: Jan 1970 - Mar 1975 Apr 1975 - Dec 1998
Constant -0:61
[1:53]
-0:09
[3:22]
Monetary activity -1:75
[1:41]
0:16
[2:09]
Real activity 2:84
[2:17]
0:22
[3:78]
Fiscal activity 1:65
[1:47]
0:05
[0:79]
Foreign trade activity -0:46
[0:59]
0:09
[1:76]
Price activity -0:25
[0:36]
0:19
[2:60]
No. of obs. 63 285
Adjusted R-squared 0:078 0:067
The dependent variable is the ￿rst di￿erence of the day-to-day money market rate. Estimated equation:
it = c + 1  moneyt + 2  realt + 3  fiscalt + 4  tradet + 5  pricet + t
Table 2: Regression Results of the Taylor Rule for the Bundesbank Using
Only Assessment Indicators
A central result is the signi￿cance of the assessment indicator for mone-
tary activity in the sample that starts in April 1975. 27 It provides evidence
that the Bundesbank indeed took into account the development of monetary
aggregates for the conduct of its monetary policy. The analysis does not allow
to determine whether the Bundesbank directly in￿uenced its target rate via
setting its monetary policy instruments or indirectly via in￿uencing market
expectations through its communication within the framework of its mon-
etary policy strategy.28 However, monetary aggregates played a signi￿cant
role in the practical implementation of the Bundesbank’s monetary policy
strategy. Similar to Gerberding, Worms, and Seitz (2004) and Clausen and
27The assessment indicators can also be used to augment standard Taylor-type rules,
that is, monetary policy rules containing standard statistical data for the output gap
and deviation of in￿ation from target. In the case of the Bundesbank the inclusion of the
assessment indicators for price activity and monetary activity increases the ￿t of the model
with respect to such a standard Taylor-type rule as measured by the adjusted R-squared.
A systematic comparison of such hybrid rules would be interesting to pursue but is beyond
the scope of this paper.
28For an analysis of the money growth targeting approach of the Bundesbank in light
of a communication strategy see von Hagen (1999).
19Meier (2005) the results also give evidence that the Bundesbank was not a
pure monetary targeter but took into consideration real activity and in￿ation
developments as well.
Besides the Bundesbank, several other central banks incorporated mone-
tary targeting elements in their policy strategies ￿ with di￿erent degrees of
success. Switzerland successfully followed a strategy of monetary targeting
from 1975 to 2000. The Federal Reserve System of the United States adhered
to a policy strategy with monetary targeting elements at the beginning of
the 1980’s, and the Bank of England pursued a strategy that focused on
monetary targeting at the end of the 1970’s and in the 1980’s. However, the
latter two central banks more or less abandoned monetary targeting elements
in their strategies after several years. In the United States a large literature
has criticised the notion of monetary targeting because of the macroeconomic
turbulence of that period and of the severity of the recession that followed. 29
The authors claim that accurate control of the money stock is not feasi-
ble or that control induces extreme volatility to money market rates. The
practical implementation of the monetary targeting strategy followed by the
Bundesbank might be a reason why criticism against monetary targeting do
not convincingly apply in the case of the German experience. The Bun-
desbank never claimed to be able to completely control money growth and
often missed its target growth rate. In large part this should be due to the
medium-term orientation of the Bundesbank’s strategy but also to a certain
degree of pragmatism which is revealed by also taking real economic and
in￿ation developments into consideration.
￿Some occasions when targets were missed may well be interpreted as
showing that at these points in time the Bundesbank allowed itself additional
room for discretion in the light of the then prevailing situation. Only rarely
have money stock overshoots been of a completely involuntary nature; mostly
rather they constituted deliberate monetary policy decisions. [...] Crucially
though, monetary policy was always analyzed with a view to achieve the ul-
timate aim of safeguarding the currency. Such an approach may be termed
‘pragmatic monetarism’...￿30
This also gives evidence why the pragmatic, ￿exible monetary targeting
approach of the Bundesbank did not induce extreme volatility to money mar-
ket rates. The Bundesbank did not mechanically try to achieve its medium
target but claimed a certain discretionary margin when judged neccessary.
Figure 4 displays that the Bundesbank did not bring extreme hikes or slumps
29McCallum (1985)
30Issing (1997). From 1990 to 1998 Otmar Issing was a member of the Board of the
Deutsche Bundesbank with a seat in the Central Bank Council.
20about its target rate since the start of monetary targeting in 1975.
Figure 4: First Di￿erences of the German Day-to-Day Money Market Rate
(monthly averages)
Critics of monetary targeting also stress that practical di￿culties coming
up through technological changes and deregulations in the payment industry
render monetary targeting practices unfeasible. These arguments do not ap-
ply in the German case as well. It is possible that money demand functions
become unstable and that targeted monetary aggregates lose explanatory
power and utility for forecasting. However, this was not the case for Ger-
many as the liberalization of ￿nancial markets and cross-border money and
capital movements was largely completed in Germany at the beginning of
the 1970s. In addition, new ￿nancial products generally turned out to be of
little relevance in Germany.31
The results of the analyses in this paper give evidence that the Bundes-
bank actually was a ￿exible monetary targeter. Its policy strategy was in
large part operational due to a combination of the Bundesbank’s pragmatic
approach and to a relatively stable ￿nancial environment in Germany after
the period of Bretton-Woods.
31Issing (1997)
215 Conclusion
This paper outlined a new method which allows to extract a central bank’s
assessment of macroeconomic key-variables from its public statements using
the balance statistic approach. Since a central bank’s assessment of key
economic variables is not contained in the information set when using readily
available statistical data such as, for example, in￿ation developments, the
generated assessment indicators capture unique information and can be used
to analyze a central bank’s monetary policy.
The method is applied to re-investigate the Bundesbank’s monetary pol-
icy strategy with a new data set and gives evidence that the Bundesbank
actually was a ￿exible monetary targeter. When estimating a monetary
policy rule with a sample ranging from April 1975 to December 1998 the
assessment indicators for monetary activity, real activity, and price activity
are signi￿cant and have the expected sign. Particularly for the monetary
indicator this is an interesting result as it was claimed in several studies that
the Bundesbank actually did not involve monetary aggregates in the conduct
of its policy.
These results then indicate that the inclusion of monetary aggregates in
a central bank’s monetary policy strategy, as done by the ECB, might not be
refuted as unreasonable right away. The example of the Bundesbank gives
evidence that successfully incorporating monetary targeting elements in a
policy strategy is possible.
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26Appendix A: Examples for the Evaluation of Statements
First of all consider three examples for the category ‘monetary activity’.
￿Das l￿ngerfristige Mittelaufkommen bei den Banken war [...] weit h￿her
als gew￿hnlich [...].￿32
The statement su￿ces to assign an out-of-trend mark as it describes the
variable ‘long-term deposits’ to be much higher than usual. The in￿uence
of long-term deposits on monetary aggregates is negative. Accordingly the
statement is evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case D in Figure 1).
￿Deutlicher noch als in den vorangegangenen Monaten beruht das starke
Wachstum der Geldmenge im Juni des Jahres auf der kr￿ftigen Expansion
der Kreditgew￿hrung der Banken an inl￿ndische Kunden. ￿33
This statement assesses two variables: ‘monetary quantity’ and ‘credits’.
Both variables change sizeably into a positive direction. As the variables are
positively correlated with the category both are evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case E
in Figure 1).
￿Insgesamt waren die Kredite [...] an inl￿ndischen Nichtbanken Ende Juli
1970 um 12.8 Prozent h￿her als vor einem Jahr.￿ 34
Nothing suggests that the variable ‘loans’ which positively in￿uences the cat-
egory ’monetary activity’ is out-of-trend. Hence the statement is evaluated
with ‘0’ (Case A in Figure 1).
Next consider three examples for the category ‘real activity’.
￿Die Investitionst￿tigkeit der Unternehmen hielt sich in den vergangenen
Monaten auf hohem Niveau.￿35
The variable ‘￿rm investments’ is described to be on a high level which is
su￿cient to assign an out-of-trend mark. As the in￿uence of ￿rm investments
on the category ‘real activity’ is positive the statement is evaluated with ‘ 1’
(Case E in Figure 1).
￿Das verarbeitende Gewerbe hat seine Produktion in den ersten beiden Monaten
32￿Long-term deposits were much higher than usual.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Bundes-
bank (May 1975), p. 6.
33￿The strong growth of the monetary quantity in June results more noticeably from a
robust domestic credit expansion than in the previous months.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the
Bundesbank (August 1976), p. 7.
34￿Overall, at the end of July 1970 loans to domestic non-banks were 12:8% higher than
in the previous year.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Bundesbank (August 1970), p. 7.
35￿The investment activity of enterprises stayed on a high level during the past months.￿
Monthly Bulletin of the Bundesbank (December 1980), p. 6.
27sp￿rbar ausgeweitet.￿36
The positive change of the variable ‘production in the manufacturing indus-
tries’ is sizeable which turns the balance towards an out-of-trend mark. As
the in￿uence of the variable on the category is positive the statement is eval-
uated with ‘1’ (Case E in Figure 1).
￿Die Produktion des produzierenden Gewerbes ist im September tendenziell
leicht gesunken.￿37
A ‘slight decrease’ is not su￿cient to assign an out-of-trend mark for the
variable ‘industrial production’. The statement is evaluated with ‘ 0’ (Case
A in Figure 1).
The following three statements are exemplary for the evaluation in the
category ‘foreign trade activity’.
￿In den hohen Auslandsbestellungen spiegelt sich die fortschreitende Kon-
junkturbelebung in wichtigen Industriel￿ndern wieder. ￿38
‘Foreign export orders’ are described to be high which is su￿cient to assign
an out-of-trend mark. As the in￿uence of the variable on the category ‘for-
eign trade activity’ is positive the statement is evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case E in
Figure 1).
￿Saisonbereinigt waren die Exporte (...) im Mai nach dem recht umsatzs-
tarken Vormonat ausgesprochen schwach. ￿39 ‘Exports’ are described to be
markedly weak which points in the direction of being below trend. As ex-
ports and foreign trade indicator are positively correlated the statement is
evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case C in Figure 1).
￿Schaltet man die Saisonschwankungen aus, so waren Aus- und Einfuhren
gleicherma￿en dem Wert nach um 1% h￿her als im Februar 1983. ￿40 The
change of the variables ‘exports’ and ‘imports’ is not sizeable. Hence they are
assumed to be in line with their trend. Both variables assessed are evaluated
with ‘0’ (Case A in Figure 1).
36￿The manufacturing industries have noticeably expanded their production during the
summer months.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Bundesbank (October 1996), p. 6.
37￿Industrial production tended to decline slightly in September.￿ Monthly Bulletin of
the Bundesbank (November 1997), p. 10.
38￿The high level of foreign export orders re￿ects the advancing economic recovery in
important industrial countries.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Bundesbank (June 1976), p. 5.
39￿After the quite top-selling previous month seasonally adjusted exports (...) were
markedly weak in May.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Bundesbank (July 1978), p. 12.
40￿After correcting for seasonal variations the values of imports and exports were 1%
higher than in February 1983.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Bundesbank (May 1983), p. 15.
28The next three examples are about the interpretation of assessments from
the category ‘￿scal activity’.
￿Demzufolge muss f￿r 1980 auch mit einem weit h￿heren Gesamtde￿zit
der ￿￿entlichen Haushalte gerechnet werden, als noch im Fr￿hjahr erwartet
worden war [...].￿41 ‘Public debt’ is expected to be considerably above pre-
vious expectations which hints that the variable will be higher than normal
in the future. Its in￿uence on the category is positive and consequently the
statement is evaluated with ‘1’ (Case E in Figure 1).
￿Der vorangegangene Monat November war f￿r den Bund [steuerlich] ein
au￿erordentlich einnahmeschwacher Monat gewesen [...]. ￿42 ‘Inland revenues’
are assessed to be ‘extraordinarily weak’ which hints that they are below
trend. The in￿uence of inland revenues on the category is negative. Conse-
quently the statement is evaluated with ‘1’ (Case B in Figure 1).
￿Auch im kommenden Jahr werden die staatlichen De￿zite weiter steigen,
aber sie werden voraussichtlich nicht die im Sommer des Jahres erwartete
Gr￿￿enordnung erreichen.￿43 Nothing suggests that the variable ‘public
de￿cit’ which positively in￿uences the category ‘￿scal activity’ is out-of-trend.
Hence the statement is evaluated with ‘0’ (Case A in Figure 1).
The next three examples show the evaluation of statements from the cat-
egory ‘price activity’.
￿Die Zunahme der Au￿enhandels- und Leistungsbilanz￿bersch￿sse [...]
geht [...] ausschlie￿lich auf die drastischen R￿ckg￿nge der Einfuhrpreise
zur￿ck.￿44 ‘Import prices’ positively in￿uence the category ‘prices’. They
have declined drastically which indicates that (part of) the category is below
trend. The statement is evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case C in Figure 1).
41￿As a result one should expect a much higher overall public de￿cit than the de￿cit
that was expected in spring.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Bundesbank (December 1980), p. 6.
42￿Inland revenues in the previous month, November, were extraordinarily weak.￿
Monthly Bulletin of the Bundesbank (January 1975), p. 9.
43￿Public de￿cits will also rise in the forthcoming year but presumably they will not
reach the magnitude that was expected in the summer of this year.￿ Monthly Bulletin of
the Bundesbank (December 1978), p. 6.
44￿The growth of the surpluses in the foreign trade balance and the current account
balance [...] can be attributed to a drastic decline in import prices.￿ Monthly Bulletin of
the Bundesbank (September 1986), p. 8. Note that this statement would also be evaluated
in the category foreign trade activity because it assesses the variable ￿trade balance￿.
29￿[...] das Problem der In￿ationsbek￿mpfung [stellt sich] mehr denn je. ￿45
One can infer from this statement that in￿ation is considerably too high.
This justi￿es an out-of-trend mark. As the variable is positively correlated
with the category the statement is evaluated with ‘ 1’ (Case E in Figure 1).
￿Die Einfuhrpreise sind im Mai saisonbereinigt wieder leicht gesunken. ￿46
One cannot infer that the variable ‘import prices’ is out-of-trend. The state-
ment is evaluated with ‘0’ (Case A in Figure 1).
45￿The problem of ￿ghting in￿ation is bigger than ever.￿ Monthly Bulletin of the Bun-
desbank (February 1974), p. 6.
46￿Seasonally adjusted import prices again slightly decreased in May.￿ Monthly Bulletin
of the Bundesbank (July 1996), p. 14.
30Appendix B: Assessment Indicators, Mean Values, and
Number of Assessed Statements
Figure 5: Assessment Indicator for Real Activity
Figure 6: Assessment Indicator for Fiscal Activity
31Figure 7: Assessment Indicator for Foreign Trade Activity
Figure 8: Assessment Indicator for Price Activity
32Appendix C: Testing for Structural Breaks
The following description is based on Bai and Perron (1998). In this appli-
cation estimation is done within a pure structural change model, that is, all
coe￿cients are subject to shifts.
Consider the linear regression with m breakpoints, that is m+1 regimes:
yt = z z z
0
t  j + ut (3)
where j = 1;:::;m + 1, t = Tj 1 + 1;:::;Tj, min(t) = h, T0 = 0, Tm+1 = T,
h denotes the minimal length of a regime, yt is the dependent variable, z z zt
are the independent variables,   j is a vector of coe￿cients, and ut is an error
term.
The following procedure estimates the unknown regression coe￿cients
^  ^  ^ j as well as the optimal position of the breakpoints ^ Tj. For each possi-
ble segment (Tj 1 + 1;:::;Tj), denoted fTjg, the corresponding least squares
estimates of j j j are obtained by minimizing the sum of squared residuals Pm+1
i=1
PTi
t=Ti 1+1[yt z z z0
t  i]2. Let ^  ^  ^ (fTjg) denote the resulting estimates. Using
the corresponding sum of squared residuals, denoted by ST(T1;:::;Tm), for the
^  ^  ^ (fTjg), the estimated breakpoints ( ^ T1;:::; ^ Tm) are such that ( ^ T1;:::; ^ Tm) =
argminT1;:::;TmST(T1;:::;Tm).
In a nutshell, given the number of breakpoints m and the minimal length
of a segment h, the procedure calculates the global sum of squared resid-
uals for all possible positions of the breakpoints. The selected breakpoints
are such that the sum of squared residuals over all segments is minimized.
The ^   (Tj) chosen are the corresponding coe￿cient estimates at the selected
breakdates ^   (^ Tj).
The maximum number of breakpoints m is determined by h: m =    1
where  is rounded to the nearest integer less or equal to T
h. To determine
the optimal number of breakpoints one applies the above procedure for m=0,
...,    1. The optimal number of breakpoints chosen is the one that yields
the smallest value of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) de￿ned as
BIC(m) = ln ^ 
2(m) + [(m + 1)q + m]
ln T
T
; (4)
where q is the number of independent variables.
Bai and Perron (1998) do not give clear guidance how to choose the
parameter h which in￿uences the position of selected breakpoints. When
choosing h too small, one ends up estimating for some segments with very
few observations. However, in their application they always choose it to be
in a range between 10% and 25% of all observations. The value of h chosen
33in this application is 48 observations, that is, a minimum sample size of
four years, which is between 14% and 17% of T, depending on the period
of analysis. Note that the chosen value of h does not allow the inclusion of
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system as a breakpoint in the analysis
covering data from January 1970 to December 1998. 47
According to Bai and Perron (1998) the BIC performs reasonably well
when no serial correlation is present in the errors. In all estimations, tests
provided no evidence of serial correlation. 48
47In the range of h=30 to 38 the beginning of 1973 is always a chosen breakpoint,
however, this number of observations is considered too small to estimate six coe￿cients
and several potential breakpoints. In the range h=39 to h=63, March 1975 is always the
selected breakpoint.
48Durbin’s alternative test for serial correlation, Stata (2005).
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